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NOTES 
Free Speech and the "Acid Bath": An Evaluation and Critique 
of Judge Richard Posner's Economic Interpretation of the 
First Amendment 
Ardent advocates within the law and economics movement do not 
place any topic outside the potential scope of economic review. Con-
sequently, there are few significant legal issues that have not been sub-
ject to economic interpretation. Now, even the "free-speech icon" has 
been subjected to the "acid bath of economics."1 
Judge Richard A. Posner's article, Free Speech in an Economic 
Perspective, 2 takes seriously the marketplace of ideas metaphor in-
voked almost seventy years ago by Justice Holmes.3 This Note is an 
evaluation and critique of the ideas embodied in Posner's article. The 
main objective is to use the first amendment as a forum from which to 
explore the potential role of "law and economics" in fields not tradi-
tionally thought of in economic terms. The Note is not intended to be 
an authoritative work on constitutional law. 
An economic evaluation of free speech must be met with mixed 
reviews. There is much that a proper view of economics can bring to 
this field of constitutional law. Economics can be useful when it is 
viewed as a science which examines the decisionmakirig process, the 
study of optimization behavior subject to constraints. Economics can-
not be helpful if it is viewed as a precise tool that can mechanically 
and independently determine the outcomes of complex problems. As 
a method, economics can lend valuable insight to the technical process 
of constitutional decisionmaking. In this capacity it can be used to 
assist in the framing of issues and in isolating the appropriate factors 
for judicial consideration. Economics is not helpful, however, in the 
inherently subjective process of weighing and quantifying competing 
concerns. It is wrong not to recognize this limitation, and it is danger-
ous to assume that difficult, value-laden decisions in areas such as free 
speech can be decided mechanically by appealing to an economic 
formula. Difficult constitutional choices cannot be avoided by viewing 
first amendment issues through the lens of an economic perspective. 
1. Posner, Free Speech in an Economic Perspective, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. l, 7 (1986). 
2. Id. 
3. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("But 
when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even 
more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired 
is better reached by free trade in ideas - that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to 
get itself accepted in the competition of the market ..•. "). 
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Part I of this .Note introduces the mechanics of the model Judge 
Posner has developed to determine whether restrictions upon speech 
should be upheld. Part II evaluates and critiques Posner's method 
from an internal perspective. This is first done by examining the theo-
retical foundations and assumptions of his economic perspective. This 
part then turns to testing the output and conclusions of the model to 
determine how successfully the theory can be turned into practice. 
Part III constitutes an external critique of Posner's model. This part 
addresses the question of whether the first amendment should be 
thought of in economic terms. After addressing the institutional 
problems associated with judicial adoption of the model, the limita-
tions inherent in the economic methodology itself, and the potential 
dangers of implementing the method, the part concludes that an eco-
nomic perspective can be a useful tool in the hands of the constitu-
tional decisionmaker, but only when used in full recognition of its 
limitations. Part IV presents some final remarks on the costs and ben-
efits of an economic perspective. 
I. POSNER'S ECONOMIC MODEL FOR FIRST AMENDMENT 
DECISIONMAKING 
In order to proceed with a thorough examination of Posner's argu-
ments, it is necessary to have a comprehensive understanding of the 
mechanical workings of his formula. This part begins by presenting a 
broad overview of the formula in its entirety. It then proceeds to ex-
amine the roles of the different variables independently. 
Posner sets forth a free speech formula the courts could use when 
deciding whether to uphold a restriction on speech.4 Posner's deci-
sionmaking model is a form of cost-benefit analysis grounded in 
Learned Hand's opinion in United States v. Dennis. s Hand's ap-
4. See Posner, supra note 1. 
5. 183 F.2d 201, 206, 212 (2d Cir. 1950) ("In each case [courts] must ask whether the gravity 
of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary 
to avoid the danger."), ajfd., 341 U.S. 494 (1951). The Supreme Court explicitly adopted the 
Hand formulation of the clear-and-present-danger test. 341 U.S. at 510. Dennis was convicted 
of conspiring to organize the Communist Party of the United States as a group to teach and 
advocate the overthrow of the government of the United States by force and violence. The two 
decisions in Dennis played an important role in the evolution of first amendment stan~ards. 
Even before Hand's decision in Dennis, the traditional clear-and-present-danger standard had 
been criticized as being too simplistic and consequently as being of no use in guiding specific 
decisions. There was a call for courts to conduct a greater degree of balancing and weighing of 
the competing factors. See P. FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT 24-28 
(1951). For an analysis of the implications of the Dennis decision and its effects on the clear-and-
present-danger test, see M. SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF SPEECH: THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDI-
CIAL REVIEW 62-66 (1966). The Court's action, or inaction, in Dennis has been sharply criti-
cized. One of these critics has been Ronald Dworkin: 
Nor does the danger of wrong decisions lie entirely on the side of excess; the failure of tl1e 
Court to act in the McCarthy period, epitomized by its shameful decision upholding the 
legality of the Smith Act in the Dennis case, may be thought to have done more damage to 
the nation than did the Court's conservative bias in the early Roosevelt period. 
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proach, similar to that of his tort negligence formula, 6 Claims that a 
restriction on speech should be upheld if the costs associated with the 
regulation are less than the social cost that the regulation is designed 
to avoid, multiplied by the probability of the social cost coming to. 
pass. In symbols this translates into upholding a regulation whenever 
B < P X L, where B is the cost of the regulation, Pis the probability 
that the speech in question will cause harm, and L is the magnitude of 
the social cost of the speech. 
While still in the cost-benefit mode, Posner's version of the formula 
is slightly more complicated. Posner decomposes the cost of the regu-
lation into two parts: the social loss from suppressing valuable infor-
mation, V, and the legal-error costs that result from implementing the 
regulation, E. For Posner, B = V + E. On the harm side of the 
equation Posner advocates discounting future harm to its present 
value. These revisions produce the expanded Dennis formula: regu-
late if V + E < P X LI (1 + i)n, where n is the number of periods 
between the time the speech occurs and the manifestation of the harm, 
and i is the rate of time preference that discounts the future cost of the 
harmful speech into its present value. 7 
R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 148 (1977). Independent of the political wisdom of 
the specific decision, however, the formula used by Judge Hand merits consideration. For a 
comprehensive analysis of the Dennis formula, including applications to a variety of fact sce-
narios and graphical illustrations, see W. VAN AisrYNE; INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 19-40 (1984). For a discussion of later judicial treatment of the Dennis decision, 
see infra note 33. 
6. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). 
7. Posner, supra note 1, at 8. The nontechnical reader should not be intimidated by Posner's 
formula. The formula is a symbolic way of stating that a regulation should be upheld if the costs 
of regulating are less than the benefits derived. The costs of regulating are found by adding the 
value of the speech lost due to the suppression, V. and the magnitude of the legal error resulting 
from implementing the restriction, E. The benefit of regulating is found by measuring the harm 
that is being avoided. The benefit, therefore, is equal to the magnitude of the harm, L, dis-
counted to its present value and multiplied ~Y the probability of the harm coming to pass, P. 
Discounting the harm is not a complicated concept. The discount rate i, is some small positive 
value, analogous to the interest rate for borrowing money. Just as the interest rate demonstrates 
that some people are willing to consume less in the future in order to consume more now, the 
discount rate reflects the greater weight that most people place upon present value; they would 
rather have their goods sooner as opposed to later. The ultimate influence that the discount rate 
has depends upon its magnitude, i, and upon the passage of time, n. The longer the period of 
time (the higher the value of n ), the larger the effect of the discount. This is seen mathematically 
by the fact that (1 +i)" gets larger as n gets larger. It is helpful to look at extreme situations to 
gain an understanding of this fact. When n = 0 (the harm is imminent) the discounting has no 
effect. This is seen by the fact that (1 +i)° = 1, (mathematically, any value raised to the zero 
power is equal to one) and Lil = L. Therefore, imminent harms are given maximum weight 
and the discounting has no effect. Conversely, as the value of n becomes very large (infinite) the 
value of (1 +i)" becomes very large (infinite) and the value of Ll(l+i)" approaches zero. In 
words, the harms on the infinite horizon are given no present weight. If the value of i = 0 (time 
is not discounted at all) then (1 +or = 1 for all values of n (time). This means that Ll(l +or 
=Lil = L. The implication is that a zero-time discount rate means that all harms are treated 
as though they were imminent. 
502 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 87:499 
A. The Value of Speech Lost Due to Suppression 
The variable V measures the worth of the information that is lost 
due to a proposed regulation. According to Posner: 
V depends on (1) the nature and value of the speech suppressed and (2), 
the amount of speech suppressed, which in turn depends on (a), the 
method, scope, and extent of the regulation, and (b), the market robust-
ness (versus fragility) of the speech suppressed - more precisely, the 
degree to which the social benefits of the speech are externalized. 8 
Quantifying Vis a two-step process. A judge must first determine the 
value or social worth of the speech.9 Once this is done, the value of 
the speech is multiplied by the quantity of speech that is actually lost. 
The weight assigned to V will be influenced by the type of regula-
tion that is being questioned. A regulation that is narrowly tailored 
and that leaves avenues open for information to be disseminated will 
translate into a smaller V and hence will be more acceptable. Con-
versely, a broad, blanket restriction will produce a higher value for V 
and will be more likely to be struck down. 1° Consequently, this 
method of calculating V would treat time, place, and manner restric-
tions more leniently than absolute prohibitions. 
The quantity of speech that is suppressed depends not only upon 
the type of restriction that is used, but also upon the nature of the 
speech that is being regulated. Some types of speech are more vulnera-
ble to regulation than are other types of speech. One of the more valu-
able insights of Posner's economic perspective is his analysis of the 
market robustness of speech. 11 A regulation upon speech is analogous 
in many ways to a tax placed upon the sale of a commodity. The effect 
that a tax has upon a commodity depends upon its elasticities of sup-
ply· and demand; these will vary greatly from product to product. 12 
The more elastic supply and demand are, the greater will be the reduc-
tion in the quantity of speech in response to the regulation. One thing 
8. Posner, supra note l, at 9. 
9. There are many difficulties with this step of the calculation. See infra notes 53-57 and 
accompanying text. 
10. This is similar to least restrictive means analysis, but Posner does not claim that judges 
must search for the smallest feasible V. All Posner's formula requires is that V + E < P X LI 
(1 +i)". If Vi is the social loss due to a blanket restriction and V1 is the social loss due to a 
narrowly tailored restriction such that Vi > V1, then both restrictions are acceptable so long as 
Vi + E1 < PX L/(J +i)". This obviously does not guarantee the best result from a social 
perspective. If the judge were required to act efficiently and minimize loss to society, then she 
would be required to choose the V1 method of restriction and reject Vi. even though Vi does not 
violate the expanded Dennis formula. 
11. See Posner, supra note 1, at 19-24. 
12. The elasticity of demand describes the responsiveness of the demand for a product as the 
price changes. The higher the elasticity, the more responsive will be the changes in demand. A 
modest tax that results in a small increase in the price of a product whose elasticity of demand is 
high will lead to a substantial decrease in the quantity of the product that is demanded. Con· 
versely, if demand is highly inelastic, then even substantial price changes will not significantly 
alter the quantities of the product demanded. 
November 1988] Note - Free Speech 503 
that affects the elasticity of demand is the availability of substitutes.13 
For example, Posner argues that the elasticity of demand for political 
information is very high. He claims that the public benefits of using 
the information for voting are not internalized by voting; 14 therefore, 
he reasons, people use political information primarily for entertain-
ment. Since there are many substitutes for this type of entertainment, 
people will readily switch to different sources if the price of obtaining 
political information is increased.15 This would result in a higher 
value for V. Demand for types of information where the social bene-
fits are directly internalized by the parties, such as commercial speech 
or pornography, will be less elastic and thus less vulnerable to 
regulation. 16 
The elasticity of supply essentially measures a person's willingness 
to engage in the speech activity, and how that willingness changes in 
response to regulation or other costs. If the elasticity of supply is high, 
then a small increase in the cost of engaging in the activity will deter 
people from doing so. An individual may choose to engage in a pro-
test if it is held downtown, whereas she may be unwilling to travel 
across the state to engage in a similar protest. At the other extreme, 
when supply is highly inelastic, increasing the costs will only have a 
small influence on a person's decision to engage in the activity.17 
13. Substitutes are products that, although not identical to the original product, satisfy sub-
stantially the same needs. For example, if color is not an important consideration, then blue and 
red pencils would be close substitutes for each other. If a regulation increased the price of red 
pencils, but did not affect the price of blue pencils, then consumers would substitute the blue for 
the red. The result would be that the demand for red pencils would be highly elastic, and conse-
quently the quantity demanded would be very responsive to small changes in price. 
14. The policy implications of the inability of political speech to internalize its benefits will be 
examined in Part 11.B.2.b. infra. · 
15. Many economic explanations necessarily begin with storytelling. Economists weave a 
tale that makes sense and then proceed empirically to verify the validity of their stories. This 
"casual empiricism," however, must not be mistaken for proven fact. Posner, the storyteller in 
this case, provides a more detailed account of this tale: 
The demand for some sorts of information probably is highly elastic, implying that a tax 
would curtail output substantially. This seems particularly true of political information, 
even if it is considered the category of highest social value. The main use to which that 
information is actually put is not, as one might suppose, a8 an input into voting, but as 
entertainment. Its private value as an input into voting is small because of the extremely 
limited private (not social) value of voting itself, which is due to the facts that no election in 
any but the tiniest politicitl subdivisions is ever decided by one vote and that the voter votes 
for candidates rather than specific programs •... The modest value that most people attach 
to voting suggests that they probably attach little value to political information and hence 
will readily substitute other forms of news and entertainment if the price of political infor-
mation rises because of a tax, whether directly or by regulation, on the sources of that 
information. · 
See Posner, supra note 1, at 23. 
16. For analysis of the implications of the varying degrees to which different types of speech 
internalize their benefits, see infra Part 11.B.2. 
17. If the tax analogy is correct, then it may imply that courts which rigidly apply the 
formula will be likely to underestimate the long-term quantity of speech lost due to regulation. 
Because of the existence of many sunk costs, supply in the short term is more inelastic. In the 
long term, supply in most markets approaches perfect elasticity. This implies that there will be a 
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The main point to be distilled from this discussion is that the exact 
social cost of regulating speech will vary with the particular character-
istics of those who engage in the activity (suppliers) and those to 
whom the message is addressed (demanders). The judge must ex-
amine the varying characteristics on a case-by-case basis when deter-
mining what value to attach to V. 
Posner outlines many other factors that influence the magnitude of 
V. One of these is the geographic scope of the authority implementing 
the restriction: the greater the size of the jurisdiction, the higher the 
value of V. 18 Posner concludes that this implies that municipal and 
state governments should be given greater authority to suppress 
speech than the national government. 19 A related factor is the size of 
the actual and potential audience for the speech. Posner claims that 
the size of the audience can be used as a proxy for the value of the 
speech in question. 20 The larger the size of the audience, the higher 
the value of V. V also will be higher for viewpoint-specific restrictions 
than for viewpoint-neutral restrictions. Viewpoint-specific regulations 
interfere with the competitive operation of the marketplace by putting 
one isolated opinion in a disadvantageous position, whereas viewpoint-
neutral regulations harm all points of view equally, and hence do not 
interfere with an opinion's relative ability to compete.21 Similarly, 
Posner, asserts that a restriction that is incidental to other goals and 
objectives will translate into a lower value of V. 22 
B. The Costs Associated with Legal Error 
The other significant variable on the cost side of the equation is the 
legal error term, E. This term recognizes the difficulty of implement-
ing any sort of restriction on speech. 23 Even carefully designed and 
well-intended regulations can suppress more than the types of speech 
that they were designed to address. These problems are magnified in a 
greater long-term reduction in speech in response to the regulation than judges might first pre-
dict. For an explanation of an industry's long-term economic reaction to a tax increase, see H. 
VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 90-91 (1984). 
18. Posner, supra note 1, at 10, 19. 
19. Id. The claim that localities should be afforded greater ability to restrict speech than the 
federal government is treated in depth in infra Part 11.B.1. 
20. Posner, supra note 1, at 8, 11-12. 
21. Id. at 12. Blanket restrictions that influence all political viewpoints equally will increase 
the randomness of public opinion due to the decrease in overall information, but they will not 
systematically bias the outcome. Viewpoint-specific regulations, on the other hand, will cause 
certain opinions to be underrepresented, and hence will influence the outcome of the political 
process. Id. at 17. 
22. Posner assumes that less speech is restricted if the suppression is unintentional than if the 
suppression is intentional. He claims that if the restriction is incidental to another goal, then the 
value for Vwill be lower because the authority's purpose is not to suppress speech. Id. at 17-19. 
This claim is not intuitive, and it is hard to believe that it would be true universally. There is also 
a potential for abuse, since speech restrictions could be tacked on to other agendas. 
23. Id. at 24-29. 
November 1988] Note - Free Speech 505 
world of imperfection. Judges may be partial to political points of. 
view that are supportive of the existing political structure. Judges are 
also predominantly conservative, wpite, and upper-middle class. This 
raises the possibility of bias in the implementation of regulations due 
to the inherent subjectivity of the decisions that must be made. 24 
Even if no bias existed, there would still be a large legal-error term, 
given the difficult nature of the task of determining the value of 
speech, the quantity of it lost due to the regulation, and the harms of 
inaction. 25 Even predicting the value of E is an imprecise science. 
The inclusion of a self-correcting error term, therefore. is essential for 
any realistic and workable model.26 The inevitability of mistakes and 
abuses in the difficult field of government regulation of speech cannot 
be ignored. This is especially true because, as the facts of the Dennis 
case illustrate, these decisions are often made in charged political envi-
ronments that are not immune from McCarthy-type mania.27 
Conditions in the actual laboratory of the courtroom are far from 
ideal. Attaching significant weight to the legal-error term would lead 
to far-reaching protection for all types of speech, including those not 
thought of as having a high value of V. Recognizing the importance of 
this factor may help to explain the great deference traditionally af-
forded to freedom of speech. Posner's inclusion of a self-correcting 
error term makes his model much more pragmatic and useful. 
C. The Probability of Harm Occurring 
Numerous factors influence the probability of the feared harm 
coming to pass, P. 28 One of these is time. Generally speaking, the 
more distant in time the harm is, the less likely it is actually to occur. 
Time affords the marketplace a chance to test the validity of the idea, 
and provides the opportunity to take alternative measures, including 
counter-advocacy, in an effort to prevent any detrimental effects.29 
24. Posner explains: "As part of the government, of the 'system,' [judges] often are interested 
parties in the dispute they are called on to decide. Their impartiality is in question, and with it 
the accuracy of their judgments." Id. at 25. 
25. The vast majority of first amendment decisions cannot be made with precision. Posner 
believes that the law's evidentiary methods "seem pretty hopeless for resolving difficult questions 
of political or scientific truth and consequence, or aesthetic value and consequence, either on the 
cost or benefit side." Id. at 26. It is important not to overestimate the accuracy of the tools with 
which constitutional decisionmakers are forced to work. 
26. As a general principle of policy formulation, it is wise to consider the transaction costs 
associated with the regulation as part of the total costs of regulating. This should be done before 
advocating any sort of governmental intervention in an effort to ensure that the cure is not worse 
than the disease. See Dahlman, The Problem of Extemality, 22 J.L. & EcoN. 141 (1979). 
27. See supra note 5. 
28. Posner, supra note 1, at 29-34. 
29. Posner's faith in the ability of the marketplace of ideas to produce truth is not universally 
shared. One co=entator has written: 
Yet, the marketplace of ideas is as flawed as the economic market. Due to developed legal 
doctrine and the inevitable effects of socialization processes, mass co=unication technol- . 
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Additionally, Posner claims that P will be higher when the speech is 
"emotive" because emotive speech is more likely to cause damage than 
speech that is more "intellectual."30 P will also be higher if the struc-
ture of the communications media is such that rival ideas cannot get 
an adequate hearing. The inability of rival ideas to gain access would 
bias the working of the marketplace. Other factors that affect the 
value of P include the level of education of the population (the higher 
the education, the lower the probability of harm), the stability of the 
nation's political institutions (the more stable the political institutions 
are, the lower the probability of harm), the speaker's intent (intended 
results are presumed to be more likely), and the degree to which the 
speaker is appealing to the audience's self-interest (appeal to self-inter-
est increases the effectiveness of speech, and hence the probability of 
harm).31 
D. The Harm Resulting from the Speech 
Posner advocates considering the magnitude of all harms that re-
sult from the speech in question. 32 This includes distant harms as well 
as imminent ones. Posner's approach is inconsistent with the current 
Supreme Court methodology found in Brandenburg v. Ohio 33 and its 
ogy, and unequal allocations of resources, ideas that support the entrenched power structure 
or ideology are the most likely to gain acceptance within our current market. Conversely, 
those ideas that threaten such structures or ideologies are largely ignored in the 
marketplace. 
Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 16-17. Other au· 
thors hold similar beliefs. "Because of monopoly control of the media, lack of access of disfa· 
vored or impoverished groups, techniques of behavior manipulation, irrational response to 
propaganda, and the nonexistence of value free, objective truth, the marketplace of ideas fails to 
achieve the desired results." Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 964, 965-66 (1978). Baker conducts a comprehensive analysis of the theories 
used to support the marketplace justification, and claims that many of the assumptions that the 
market theory depends upon are false. Id. at 967-81. 
30. Posner, supra note l, at 31. Posner's contention is that emotive speech deserves less 
protection because it leads to the breakdown of the communications process. The use of pure 
intellect, however, does not hold a monopoly on the category of meaningful forms of communi· 
cation. Just how far Posner advocates taking this distinction is unclear, however. The potential 
abuses of such a standard are manifold. How is a judge to decide what speech is emotive, and 
what speech is intellectual? Does a judge extend less first amendment protection to USA Today 
than to the New York Times because of the use of full color pictures? 
31. Posner, supra note 1, at 32-34. The standards that Posner outlines to determine the 
probability of the feared harm coming to pass come very close to saying, "if the speech is elfec· 
tive, then it is not protected." Speech that is important and necessary will be likely to register 
very high on Posner's probability scale. Speeches given by the great advocates of civil rights in 
the 1950s and 1960s serve as an example. The speakers were calling for immediate action: they 
used a wide range of rhetorical tools including powerful emotional appeals as well as intellectual 
appeals; there was great fear of political instability; the speakers intended to produce results; and 
they were appealing to the self-interest of many members of the audience. The guarantees of the 
first amendment are not very meaningful if they only protect watered-down and ineffective forms 
of advocacy. 
32. See Posner, supra note 1, at 34-36. 
33. 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam). The Court in Brandenburg overturned the convic· 
tion of a Ku Klux Klan leader who was convicted for advocating the necessity of violent and 
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progeny. Brandenburg, unlike Posner's theory, does not allow poten-
tial future harms to be used as a rationale for the suppression of pres-
ent advocacy. 
Posner's formula does not weigh the full magnitude of the future 
harm; it discounts the future harm to its present value. 34 A harm will 
be given less and less weight the further away it is in time. Discount-
ing future harm must be distinguished from a decrease in the likeli-
hood of the harmful occurrence. The former assumes that the harm 
will occur and discounts its magnitude. The latter challenges the 
probability of the harmful event occurring in the first place. 
In making his final decision, the judge implementing Posner's 
formula must calculate the magnitude of the harm that will result 
from the speech, L, decide at what point in time the harm will occur, 
n, select the appropriate social discount rate, i, and then compute a 
value for L/(1 +ir. 
II. AN EVALUATION AND CRITIQUE OF POSNER'S METHOD 
This part's main objective is to conduct an internal critique of Pos-
ner's model. This is done on two levels. The first section evaluates the 
procedural operation of the model. It identifies some of the assump-
tions involved in adopting an· economic perspective and explores their 
validity in the constitutional setting. The second section examines the 
output of the model by testing the validity of specific conclusions Pos-
ner draws from his economic premises. 
A. Understanding the Model: Theoretical Objectives Through 
Mechanical Implementation 
Economics is essentially the study of making choices and striking 
tradeoffs between competing interests. Understood as such, it has a 
potential analogue in first amendment law, where difficult choices are 
commonplace. Its principles, however, cannot be blindly applied, be-
cause economic tools cannot be employed without making assump-
tions about the underlying nature of the problem that is being 
addressed. Deciding whether economic analysis is appropriate, then, 
unlawful means of political reform. In its decision, the Court did not use the balancing formula 
that it had adopted in Dennis. The concurring opinions of Justice Black and Justice Douglas, 
both of whom wrote strong dissents in Dennis, make it clear that the Dennis formula is no longer 
the guide for first amendment decisionmaking. The Court in Brandenburg established broad 
protection for first amendment rights, claiming that speech can only be regulated if the danger is 
serious, likely, and imminent. For a discussion of first amendment standards and the clear-and-
present-danger standard as it evolved from its origins in the early 1900s through Dennis, and to 
Brandenburg, see Strong, Fifty Year.r of "Clear and Present Danger": From Schenck to Branden-
burg - and Beyond, 1969 SUP. Cr. R.Ev. 41. 
34. Discounting assumes that people are more concerned with ills that are immediate than 
with dangers that are distant. For a more detailed discussion, see supra note 7. 
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frequently centers on deciding whether the characteristics of the prob-
lem make the underlying assumptions reasonable. 
This section outlines some of the explicit and implicit assumptions 
behind an economic perspective. Its purpose is to develop an under-
standing of the economic process and to identify some of the problems 
in its application to constitutional questions. Specific methodological 
problems arise in trying to quantify the various interests and in assum-
ing that preferences concerning rights fit neatly into a neoclassical eco-
nomic mold. 
1. The Theoretical Background and Assumptions Underlying an 
Economic Perspective 
Even in light of the breadth of the law and economics literature,35 
it appears incongruous to view the first amendment from an economic 
perspective. This incongruity is lessened when one adopts a proper 
understanding of the meaning of the term economics. Economics can 
be defined as "the science of choice under conditions of scarcity."36 
Its uniqueness and usefulness stem not from the topics it addresses, 
but from its process of decisionmaking. As one law and economics 
commentato~ explains, "[t]he general theory of choice that is at the 
core of economics, is a deductive mechanism whose structure and for-
mal validity are independent of its specific applications."37 The tools 
of the economist are valuable even when the issues at stake cannot be 
reduced to dollars and cents. When one views economics as the study 
of making optimal "choices when faced with pragmatic constraints, its 
35. "Law and economics" is a catch-all phrase that describes attempts to apply economic 
principles to legal issues. For a basic introduction to the various issues treated under the law and 
economics rubric, see P. BURROWS & c. VEUANOVSKJ, THE EcONOMJC APPROACH TO LAW 
(1985); N. MERCURO & T. RYAN, LAW, EcONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY (1984); C. VEUA· 
NOVSKI, THE NEW LAW-AND-EcONOMJCS: A REsEARCH REVIEW (1982) [hereinafter c. 
VEUANOVSKJ, LAW AND EcoNOMICS]; Cooter, Law and the Imperialism of Economics: An 
Introduction to the Economic Analysis of Law and a Review of the Major Books, 29 U.C.L.A. L. 
REV. 1260 (1982); Veljanovski, The Economic Approach to Law: A Critical Introduction, 7 BRIT. 
J. L. & Soc. 158 (1980). The number of topics that have been subjected to an economic interpre-
tation is vast. Economics has been applied to issues ranging from traditional topics such as torts 
and contracts to more unconventional speculation about a marketplace for babies in the field of 
adoption. For a recent review of adoption and market theory, see, for example, Cass, Coping 
with Life, Law, and Markets: A Comment on Posner and the Law-and-Economics Debate, 61 
B.U. L. REV. 73 (1987); Cohen, Posnerism, Pluralism, Pessimism, 61 B.U. L. REV. 105 (1987); 
Frankel & Miller, The Inapplicability of Market Theory to Adoptions, 61 B.U. L. REV. 94 (1987); 
Posner, The Regulation of the Market in Adoptions, 61 B.U. L. REV. 59 (1987). For an insider's 
view of what mainstream law and economics is, and what it is trying to accomplish, see Kitch, 
The Intellectual Foundations of "Law and Economics'~ 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 184 (1983). For a 
solid introduction to the economic principles most frequently used in the literature, see Com-
ment, Posnerian Jurisprudence and Economic Analysis of Law: The View from the Bench, 133 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1117, 1118-26 (1985). 
36. c. VEUANOVSKI, LA w AND EcONOMICS, supra note 35, at is. 
37. Id. 
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potential role in constitutional decisionmaking begins to emerge. 38 
The underlying premise of Posner's economic analysis is that free 
speech (under the first amendment) is not an absolute value.39 If free 
speech were an absolute value, then the optimum choice for a judge to 
make when faced with a choice between it and a competing value 
would always be to uphold the free speech interest. 40 In reality, how-
ever, judges are frequently faced with explicit trade-offs between com-
peting values and objectives. For example, judges have faced choices 
38. Posner is not the first one to envision a role for economics within constitutional theory. 
A pioneer in the field was Charles Beard who wrote: 
But enough has been said to show that the concept of the Constitution as a piece of abstract 
legislation reflecting no group interests and recognizing no economic antagonisms is entirely 
false. It was an economic document drawn with superb skill by men whose property inter-
ests were immediately at stake; and as such it appealed directly and unerringly to identical 
interests in the country at large. 
C. BEARD, AN EcONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
188 (1913). Beard argues for a historical analysis of the Constitution that appreciates the impor-
tance of the economic forces behind its writing and adoption. He does not, however, advocate a 
prospective economic application of its tenets, nor does he address the economics of "rights" 
such as freedom of speech. For an impressive symposium concerning the relationship between 
economics and constitutional law, with its central theme an evaluation of Beard's work, see The · 
Constitution as an Economic Document, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1 (1987). Other authors have 
suggested that economics should play a more active role in the application of the Constitution. 
See, e.g., Director, The Parity of the Economic Marketplace, 7 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1964). Director 
discusses free speech in economic terms, noting its similarity to the marketplace for goods, and 
questioning its unique protected status. Id. at 3-7. He does not attempt any specific analysis 
such as Posner's, however. Pure economists have not been silent on the issue of the first amend-
ment. See, e.g., B. OWEN, EcoNOMICS AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1975). This book exam-
ines, from an economist's perspective, court precedent concerning freedom of expression as it 
applies specifically to media. Owen emphasizes the need to adjust to changing market structures. 
Id. at 186-89. See also I. POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM (1983). Pool examines the poten-
tial impacts that changing market structures and technologies may have on freedom of speech 
and the first amendment. 
39 .. Although Posner argues that it is wrong to give freedom of speech absolute protection, 
and ti.at a consideration oftradeoffs is necessary, many scholars would strongly disagree with the 
propriety of weighing the first amendment against some utilitarian concept of the general good. 
Dworkin has argued that "the government is not entitled to constrain liberty of speech, for exam-
ple, whenever it thinks that would improve the general welfare." R. DWORKIN, supra note 5, at 
270. Dworkin argues that strong rights will have no meaning if they can be outweighed by the 
general interest. 
In order to save them, we must recognize as competing rights only the rights of other mem-
bers of the society as individuals. We must distinguish the "rights" of the majority as such. 
• . . The test we must use is this. Someone has a competing right to protection, which must 
be weighed against an individual right to act, if that person would be entitled to demand that 
protection from his government on his own title, as an individual, without regard to whether 
a majority of his fellow citizens joined in the demand. 
Id. at 194. Dworkin illustrates his claim that balancing should not take place by examining anti-
riot Jaws versus rights to free speech in the context of the Chicago Seven trial. Id. at 197-204. 
For an interesting application of Dworkin's view that rights should be able to "trump" utilities, 
see Thompson, The Trolley Problem, 94 YALE L.J. 1395, 1404-06 (1985) (The trolley problem 
asks whether a person can switch a set of trolley tracks, killing one person, if the action would 
save five others.) The belief that some rights are not subject to trade-offs, and are in a sense 
inalienable, can have a firm basis in economic principles. See Caiabresi & Melamed, Property 
Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 
1111-15 (1972). 
40. Even if this were true, there would still be a potential role for economics if the judge had 
to choose between competing free speech values. 
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in the past between freedom of the press and national security,41 free-
dom of speech and national pride,42 and freedom of speech and indi-
vidual privacy.43 In many circumstances, free speech cannot be 
pursued without incurring some cost; therefore, the decision to uphold 
speech as a value necessarily entails sacrificing some other good.44 
The realization that certain trade-offs cannot be avoided does not 
provide any guidance as to how the ultimate decisions are to be made. 
Posner advocates that courts adopt a cost-benefit analysis approach. 
In theory he claims that a restriction on speech should be upheld if the 
benefits of suppressing the speech outweigh the costs.45 This is cap-
tured by the formulaic expression: regulate if V + E < P X LI (1 
+ i;n. If one accepts the original premise that speech is not an absolute 
value and that the judge must consider the costs of upholding speech, 
then this is not an unreasonable way to frame the issue. As a general 
thesis, however, the cost-benefit statement is true by definition. It is 
little different from saying that the judge should always make the cor-
rect decision. The controversial step arises in the concrete application 
of the formula, when the variables are actually quantified. 46 
The process of quantifying variables necessitates making assump-
tions about the nature of the problem being addressed. All modeling 
involves some degree of abstraction. Ideally, all relevant factors would 
be considered; unfortunately, it is neither practical nor possible to be 
completely comprehensive.47 Given this fact, no model can ever per-
fectly mirror reality. The real issue then becomes: Is the approxima-
41. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (the "Pentagon Papers" 
case). 
42. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
43. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
44. The existence of trade-offs does not necessarily vindicate a Posnerian fonnula, but it does 
illustrate the need to have some consistent method of deciding which values to promote. 
45. Implicit in this type of cost-benefit analysis, as well as in most economics theory, is the 
assumption that policymakers should use a wealth-maximization decision rule. This use of effi-
ciency as a means to guide decisions is not uncontroversial. See Kaplow, The Accuracy of Tradi-
tional Market Power Analysis and a Direct Adjustment Alternative, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1817, 1822 
(1982); see generally Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191 (1980); Kronman, 
Wealth Maximization as a Normative Principle, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 227, (1980); Posner, The 
Value of Wealth: A Comment on Dworkin and Kronman, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 243 (1980). 
46. This step of Posner's analysis must be closely examined; in later applications of the model 
he cannot be allowed to escape to the tautological safety of the general cost-benefit analysis 
thesis. 
47. The impossibility of practicing complete rationality is explained by Charles Lindblom: 
Ideally, rational-comprehensive analysis leaves out nothing important. But it is impossible 
to take everything important into consideration unless "important" is so narrowly defined 
that analysis is, in fact, quite limited. Limits on human intellectual capacities and on avail-
able information set definite limits on man's capacity to be comprehensive. In actual fact, 
therefore, no one can practice the rational-comprehensive method for really complex 
problems, and every administrator faced with a sufficiently complex problem must find ways 
to simplify drastically. 
Lindblom, The Science of ''Muddling Through," in POLICY-MAKING IN AMERICAN GOVERN-
MENT 31 (E. Schneider ed. 1969). 
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tion provided by the model close enough to reality to be instructive?48 
The criticism of most models centers upon the viability of the assump-
tions made during the abstraction process. In this criticism, the fac-
tors that are left out of the model are just as important as those 
included in it. 
Frequently, however, the assumptions made during the abstraction 
process are forgotten when the model is later applied, and the simpli-
fied model is mistakenly viewed as a complete expression of reality. A 
pervasive problem in the law and economics literature is this type of 
unquestioning application of controversial and qualified economic 
principles. Too little attention is paid to identifying the implicit as-
sumptions behind the economics and asking whether those assump-
tions are justified in the legal setting to which they are being applied.49 
A rigorous evaluation of law and economics analysis, then, must 
begin by scrutinizing the underlying economic assumptions. Many 
conditions must be satisfied before any economic machinery can be 
employed. This Note will examine two of these conditions explicitly 
in an effort to illustrate some of the potential problems of applying 
economic analysis to the realm of first amendment law. The economic 
assumptions are those of "completeness" and "continuity." These as-
sumptions constitute part of the underlying infrastructure of utility 
maximization theory. Utility maximization theory is used in assisting 
a decisionmaker in determining the necessary trade-offs between com-
peting interests. 
The assumption of completeness is essential to the construction of 
a workable utility function. Utility functions provide a means of or-
dering preferences: Which item, X or Y, is more preferred? Before 
any ranking can take place, it must first be possible to compare item X 
and item Y. The requirement of completeness simply states that either 
X is preferred to Y, or Y is preferred to X, or both. so If X and Y 
cannot be compared and ranked for all relevant combinations under 
48. Some authors question the possibility of ever constructing a model that could adequately 
encompass the complex reality underlying constitutional conflicts. See Shiffrin, The First 
Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away from a General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 
Nw. U. L. REv. 1212, 1252 (1983) ("The nature of social reality is too complex to expect that 
any single vision, value, or technique could meet the needs of society."). 
49. Reasoning in law and economics is a multistep process. One begins with economic as-
sumptions and premises. From these, economic conclusions are drawn. These economic conclu-
sions then become the premises from which legal conclusions are derived. In determining 
whether such legal conclusions are valid, one must ask: What are the original economic assump-
tions? Are they valid? Do they entail the economic conclusions? Finally, do the economic con-
clusions imply the legal results? Frequently in reviewing law and economics analysis, some of 
these steps are omitted. 
50. This concept is symbolically defined as follows: "(COMPLETENESS) For all x. y in X 
either x ~ y or y ~ x or both." H. VARIAN, supra note 17, at 111. The case of both X being 
preferred to Y and Y being preferred to X is just another way of saying that the individual is 
indifferent between the two options. 
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consideration, then there cannot be any rational economic guide to 
decisionmaking. 
The assumption of continuity implies that small changes in X and 
Y will translate into proportionately small changes in the resulting 
value of utility.51 A nonmathematical example of a discontinuous 
function is found in a literal interpretation of the rule of Brandenburg 
v. Ohio. 52 This rule does not allow potential future harm to serve as a 
justification for suppressing present advocacy. A small change in time 
from zero (immediate harm) to one time period into the future results 
in a discontinuous drop in outcomes, from the result that suppression 
of speech is acceptable to the result that suppression of speech is 
unacceptable. 
The existence of continuity is a guarantee against the unexpected. 
If a relationship is continuous, then knowledge of the state of affairs at 
one point allows one to make fairly reliable approximations about the 
state of affairs at all points "close" to it. If a function is not continu-
ous, however, then the unexpected can happen, and a minute change 
in the vai.-iables can translate into a drastic change in the outcome. 
Without continuity, it is difficult to make statements about the rela-
tionship between variables that will be valid under all relevant 
circumstances. 
The assumptions of completeness and continuity underlie the fun-
damental economic principle that, at some level, all goods are substi-
tutes for each other. If all goods are substitutes, then there will always 
exist a rate of exchange (price) at which a person will give up a certain 
amount of good X to get more of good Y. The central inquiry of eco-
nomics then becomes: How much of good X is necessary in order to 
gain the desired quantity of Y? 
The example of striking a compromise between freedom of the 
press and national security can serve as an illustration. To begin with, 
it must be possible to compare free press and national security before 
any meaningful "economic" discussion can take place. Next, it must 
be possible to rank in order of preference having X1 amount of free 
press and Y1 amount of national security versus having X2 amount of 
free press and Y2 amount of national security for all relevant values of 
X and Y. This is just a way of saying that the preferences are complete. 
If small changes in the quantity of free speech and national security 
produce proportionately small changes in the value of utility, then the 
utility function is said to be continuous. Finally, if the judge is able to 
quantify the variables accurately and decide how much national secur-
51. There are many formal ways to define what it means for a function,/, to be continuous at 
a given point xo-. ''! is said to be continuous at x0 if1im...-..x0 f(x) = f(x0); equivalently, given 
any e > 0 there ts a 8 > 0 such that l/(x)-/ (x0) I < e whenever Ix - Xo I < 8." W. PARZYNSKI 
& P. ZIPSE, INTRODUCTION TO MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS 94 (1982) (emphasis in original). 
52. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). 
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ity society is willing to sacrifice in order to obtain an extra increment 
of free press (determining the price, or rate of exchange), then she will 
be able to decide what trade-offs should be made in any given case. 
2. The Mechanics of Implementation: Can Theory Be 
Turned into Practice? 
How realistic are these economic assumptions in the field of consti-
tutional law? The exact calculations involved in implementing Pos-
ner's formula would be exceedingly difficult to perform. 53 
Unfortunately, Posner does not explicitly deal with these mechanical 
problems. The values and principles inherent in the first amendment 
are not readily quantifiable. If an economic perspective is to make any 
sense, however, it must be possible to make exact comparisons. In 
order to make comparisons, each interest must be assigned a quantifi-
able value, and then that value must be translated into a common mea-
sure. The philosophical difficulties in comparing the v~ue of free 
speech versus the need for public safety are not entirely different in 
kind from the difficulties of comparing the intrinsic worth of wheat 
versus the intrinsic worth of shoes. For wheat and shoes, however, 
aggregate preferences establish a price, and the market price of each, 
in common denominational terms, can serve as a proxy for their in-
trinsic worth. The market price can then be used as a basis for com-
parison. The difficulty with constitutional analysis comes from the 
fact that there is no similar marketplace for speech, and hence no simi-
lar common denominator or objective external measure of value. 
The success or failure of an economic approach to constitutional 
law will ultimately lie in the ability to construct an accurate and objec-
tive external measure for hard-to-quantify values and interests. With-
out any type of traditional, observable market for the factors in 
question, scholars will have to look to other sources to evaluate their 
worth.54 
53. Most criticism of proposals such as Posner's stems not from disagreement over the desir-
ability of constructing a rational, systematic approach to decisionmaking, but from the belief that 
such an approach is evasive and unrealistic. For example, in reflecting on models similar to those 
currently proposed by law and economics theorists, Professor Roscoe Pound once observed: 
Philosophical jurists have devoted much attention to deducing of some method of getting at 
the intrinsic importance of various interests so that an absolute formula may be reached in 
accordance with which it may be assured that the weightier interests shall prevail: If this 
were possible it would greatly simplify the task of legislators, judges, administrative officials 
and jurists and would conduce to greater stability, uniformity and certainty in the adminis-
tration of justice .•.. But however common and natural it is for philosophers and jurists to 
seek such a method, we have come to think today that the quest is futile. 
3 R POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 330 (1959). 
54. One area that is unlikely to produce an objective external measure is the amorphous 
concept of efficiency. Claiming that speech has value insofar as it is efficient, or promotes effi-
ciency, begs the question. Efficiency as a concept is contextual. It has meaning only when it is 
spoken of relative to some underlying set of goals and values. The real problem is to articulate 
what the underlying set of goals and values is. In addressing this problem, efficiency can provide 
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Professor Aleinikoff has summarized the difficulty of finding an ac-
ceptable scale in the constitutional setting: 
Competing interests are not, by definition, incomparable. Apples and 
oranges can be placed on a fruit scale or assigned a price in dollars per 
pound. The problem for constitutional balancing is the derivation of the 
scale needed to translate the value of interests into a common currency 
for comparison. The balancer's scale cannot simply represent the per-
sonal preferences of the balancer, lest constitutional law become [an] ar-
b. f ·11 55 itrary act o w1 . . . . . 
The absence of a clear external guide opens the door to the potential 
danger of arbitrary personal preferences being interjected to fill the 
vacuum. Abstract values such as freedom of speech do not fit well 
into a rigid cost-benefit analysis. 56 There is also a danger that the 
judge will simply abdicate her responsibility, resolving the problem by 
avoiding it. Professor Tribe argues that decisionmakers frequently 
react in this fashion by de-emphasizing any variable that is hard to 
quantify: 
The appeal of utilitarian policy analysis, as well as its power, lies in its 
ability to reduce various dimensions of a problem to a common denomi-
nator. The inevitable result is not only that "soft" variables - such as 
the value of vindicating a fundamental right or preserving human dignity 
- tend to be ignored or understated, but also that entire problems are 
reduced to terms that misstate their structure and that ignore the nu-
ances that give these problems their full character. 57 
The breakdown of utilitarian analysis described by Tribe can be 
traced in part to problems with traditional utility-maximization theory 
and, in particular, to a failure of the underlying assumptions of com-
pleteness and continuity. First amendment issues do not fit neatly into 
an objective, quantifiable format. The utility curves describing prefer-
ences a~d trade-offs relating to rights are very different from those 
no guidance. One economic commentator has described the bankruptcy of efficiency as a deci· 
sion rule as follows: 
In the abstract, efficiency, that is the maximization principle, is an empty concept. It simply 
means achieving ends in the best possible way. Thus, the content of efficiency is arbitrary 
and flexible; one is only efficient with respect to a set of specified objectives maximized 
subject to a set of constraints .... [T]he content of efficiency outcomes depends crucially on 
the assumptions underlying the analysis. 
c. VEUANOVSKI, LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 35, at 37. 
55. Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L. J. 943, 973 (1987). 
56. Professor Tribe noted that similar problems arise in the field of environmental law: 
Variously described as fragile, intangible, or unquantifiable, these values have been widely 
thought to possess particular features making them intrinsically resistant to inclusion along 
with such allegedly "hard" concerns as technical feasibility and economic efficiency. In 
particular, those dimensions of a choice for which market prices do not exist have seemed to 
pose intractable obstacles to "objective measurement." 
Tribe, Ways Not To Think About Plastic Trees: New Foundations for Environmental Law, 83 
YALE L.J. 1315, 1318 (1974) [hereinafter Tribe, Ways Not To Think About Plastic Trees]. 
57. Tribe, Constitutional Calculus: Equal Justice or Economic Efficiency?, 98 HARV. L. REV. 
592, 596 (1985). 
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describing preferences for typical market commodities. As Professor 
Tribe describes, these differences are significant: 
The curves generated by this sort of analysis will at times have a more 
complex structure than those typically assumed by analysts, especially 
those trained primarily in neoclassical economics. For example, most 
individuals would probably not trade breathing rights below a certain 
point for even limitless rights to pollute. And many persons - far from 
regarding such human capacities as eyesight, hearing and physical mo-
bility as all subject to continuous trade-offs to levels approaching zero 
- probably have preference orderings that display significant disconti-
nuities, lexicalities, and nonzero thresholds which an adequate analysis 
would be forced to consider. 5s 
The difficulty in rigorously describing the ordering of preferences 
for rights is a serious problem that must be confronted directly with 
new approaches. While Tribe characterizes current methods as being 
"too blunt to be of very great use in this endeavor,''59 he concedes that 
theoretically there is nothing "which inherently precludes their intelli-
gent use by a public decisionmaker in the service of these 'intangible,' 
or otherwise 'fuzzy,' concems."60 If constitutional law is to be rigor-
ously subjected to an economic analysis, it will be necessary for econo-
mists to refine their tools to meet the special needs of the legal field 
and to pay special attention to the unique characteristics of rights-
oriented problems. If economic theory is to be successfully turned 
into legal practice, it will require a level of sophistication that hereto-
fore has not been exhibited by either the judge or the academic. Given 
the importance of the interests at stake, it is essential that economic 
theory relating to first amendment rights develops a new awareness. 
Bad balancing produces bad decisions and bad law. In discussing the 
need for all important factors to be included in the decisionmaking 
model, Professor Paul Kauper once expressed these fears: "It is im-
portant that the Court, in applying the balancing technique, ade-
quately identify the various public and private interests which are 
involved and their relative importance. Otherwise the balancing pro-
cess can easily become a method for rationalizing the dilution of im-
portant freedoms."61 
The potential obstacles to a successful application of economic 
analysis are many. A traditional economic approach will have partic-
ular difficulty, for example, confronting the issue of "process." Many 
aspects of legal practice in general, and constitutional law in particu-
58. Tribe, Ways Not To Think About Plastic Trees, supra note 56, at 1321 (footnote omitted); 
see also c. VEUANOVSKI, LA w AND EcONOMICS, supra note 35, at 138-39; Tribe, Technology 
Assessment and the Fourth Discontinuity: The Limits of Instrumental Rationality, 46 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 617, 629 (1973) [hereinafter Tribe, Technology Assessment and the Fourth Discontinuity]. 
59. Tribe, Ways Not To Think About Plastic Trees, supra note 56, at 1320. 
60. Id. at 1319. 
61. Kauper, Book Review, 58 MICH. L. REV. 619, 627 (1960) (footnote omitted). 
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lar, are concerned with preserving the benefits that flow from a respect 
for the various aspects of process. The means used are often just as 
important and beneficial as the ends achieved. Traditional economists, 
on the other hand, have a preoccupation with ends. One commentator 
on law and economics observed, "[e]conomists often maintain a sharp 
distinction between means and ends, and tend to assume that means or 
process yield no value independent of the ends which they promote."62 
Posner's formula, in many respects, typifies this problem. Why is 
speech valuable? The answer for Posner is that political speech is an 
input into voting and voting produces social benefits. This answer ig-
nores the possibility that the speaker benefits, or that the mere act of 
engaging in political speech is intrinsically valuable. 63 In fact, Posner 
completely disregards the possibility that the benefit to the individual 
should be factored into the constitutional dimension of the formula. 64 
Tribe warns that the failure to account accurately for "process," like 
the failure to account for any other important factors in a decision-
making model, will distort the ultimate outcome. "By focusing all but 
exclusively on how to optimize some externally defined end state, pol-
icy-analytic methods distort thought, and sometimes action, to 
whatever extent process makes - or ought to make - an independent 
difference."65 While this criticism is not necessarily fatal, it does high-
light the importance of the economist being sensitive to the special 
needs and demands of the noneconomic field in which the economic 
analysis is being performed. One solution may be to factor process 
considerations directly into the cost-benefit formula. 66 There is no in-
trinsic reason why a careful economic evaluation could not be adjusted 
to pay more attention to the importance of means. Special care must 
be taken, however, so that attempts to consider process in the analysis 
do not destroy it as a value. 67 
62. c. VEUANOVSKJ, LAW AND EcONOMICS, supra note 35, at 139. 
63. Under an economic formula, free speech rights are protected not for what they are, but 
rather for what they do. This is a potentially dangerous result of employing the economist's 
tools. "Recognizing individual rights which focus on achieving results (particularly imprecisely 
defined results such as having society reach the best or 'proper' decision) converts the right into a 
guaranteed adequate means to an end." Baker, supra note 29, at 987. 
64. See Posner, supra note 1, at 49 ("But self-expression has no obvious connection with the 
first amendment."). Many scholars would disagree strongly with Posner's claim. See, e.g., 
Baker, supra note 29, at 992 ("[I]ndividual self-fulfillment and participation in change are funda· 
mental purposes of the first amendment."). For a summary of the views expressed by Baker, see 
Shiffrin, supra note 48, at 1239-51. This difference between Posner and other constitutional theo-
rists underscores an important point. In assigning values to the interests at stake, the judge is 
forced to make final judgments on very controversial and unsettled issues. The existence of this 
subjective step undermines any claim that the economic perspective produces value-neutral or 
objective results. 
65. Tribe, Technology Assessment and the Fourth Discontinuity, supra note 58, at 631 (em-
phasis in original). 
66. Id. at 632-33. 
67. Accounting for these interests is a delicate process. "[I]t may be that some 'processual' 
values are destroyed or at least distorted by the very process of being reduced to purely instru· 
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The analysis in this section barely scratches the surface of both the 
potential problems and unique challenges inherent in a rights-based 
economic perspective. Many of these methodological difficulties are 
not dealt with in Posner's article. It is important tq recognize that 
economic principles should not be used unless both the nature of the 
legal problem and the internal policy choices which are made justify 
the assumptions, both explicit and implicit, of the economic theory. 
The field of first amendment law does not fit neatly into a neoclassical 
economic interpretation. There are substantial difficulties in measur-
ing, classifying, and comparing the competing interests. These 
problems do not lead to the conclusion that an economic perspective 
cannot be helpful; they simply demonstrate the need for the economist 
to pay attention to the special characteristics of the legal problem. 
They also demonstrate the need for more work in developing a com-
prehensive theory of rights-based economics. 
B. Testing the Results of the Model 
The validity of the results which flow from Posner's economic 
method must also be examined. Posner applies his model to many 
different fields of first amendment law. There are general problems 
trying to distinguish what parts of the article are logical extensions of 
the reasoning implicit in the model, and what parts are Posner's own 
personal views of the first amendment. This Note will not attempt to 
evaluate all of Posner's conclusions and applications. It settles upon 
two specific conclusions that Posner claims are both unique and di-
rectly the product of an economic approach to free speech. These con-
clusions are (1) localities should be afforded greater ability to suppress 
speech than the federal government, and (2) extemality analysis can 
guide government policies towards the regulation of speech. 
1. Claim: Localities Should Be Afforded Greater Authority To 
Suppress Speech Than the Federal Government 
Posner claims that the suppression of speech by state and local 
governments is more justified than similar actions by the federal gov-
ernment. 68 He bases this argument solely on the nature of the entity 
imposing the regulation and claims that the conclusion is valid in-
dependent of the type of regulation that is being questioned. 69 Pos-
ner's first major argument in support of this claim centers on the cost 
side of the equation; Posner maintains that "[t]he social costs from" 
suppressing political speech are greater at the federal than at the state 
mental status, much as 'rights' are flattened by any such treatment." Id. at 633 n.54 (emphasis in 
original). A high degree of sensitivity to the unique aspects of the given problem is needed. 
68. Posner, supra note 1, at 37. 
69. Posner's conclusion that state and local governments should be afforded more regulatory 
leeway than the federal government assumes that all other relevant factors are held constant. 
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level, and at the state than at the local level."70 Posner reasons that 
the lower one descends the governmental scale, the greater the 
number of competitive checks on the potential abuse of power.71 To 
illustrate this point he argues that if people are upset with the political 
environment of the city in which they live, then they can simply move 
to a different city. The same holds true for people upset with the poli-
cies of the state in which they reside, though even Posner concedes 
that such a move is made with greater difficulty. Finally, Posner con-
cludes that since it is "only with very great difficulty"72 that people 
can move to a different country, the federal government must be held 
to a higher standard. 
Posner's second argument in support of giving local authorities 
more power to suppress speech concerns the assessment of the value of 
the speech lost due to the restriction, the V term in the expanded Den-
nis formula. Posner claims that the value of speech suppressed by a 
restriction imposed by an authority with only a small geographic area 
under its jurisdiction is less than the value of speech suppressed by an 
identical restriction imposed by an authority with a larger jurisdic-
tion. 73 This argument assumes that the size of the geographic area 
corresponds positively with the size of the affected population. The 
conclusion that states and localities should be allowed greater author-
ity to suppress speech is a natural outgrowth of his use of the size of 
the actual and potential audience as a proxy for the value of the speech 
in question. 74 A small actual and potential audience translates into a 
small value for V and hence a greater probability that the restriction 
will be upheld when the formula is mechanically applied. If this argu-
ment is valid, then it necessarily implies that speech expressed at the 
local level intrinsically has less social value. 
A third argument, not specifically proposed by Posner, but consis-
tent with the theories expressed in his article, is that the existence of 
substitute sources of speech in alternative localities significantly 
reduces the cost, in terms of damage to the national marketplace, of 
any particular local restriction on speech. When one views the restric-
tion from an aggregate market perspective, a local regulation can be 
characterized as a partial limitation of access, while only a federal reg-
ulation can constitute a total ban. If the Constitution is concerned 
primarily with the effects of a given restriction on the national market-
place of ideas, then the main objective of the first amendment would 
be to guarantee the access of an idea to that marketplace. The specific 
avenue through which it is introduced would only be a secondary con-
70. Posner, supra note 1, at 10. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. at 11. 
73. Id. at 19. 
74. Id. at 12. 
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sideration. Assuming that speech in one locality is a close substitute 
for speech in another locality,75 the actions of one locality in isolation 
cannot significantly impair the competitive operation of the national 
marketplace. For example, if Ann Arbor, Michigan, suppresses a 
given type of speech, but that type of speech is expressed in Spokane, 
Washington, and hence gains access to the nationa~ marketplace, then 
the aggregate harm of Ann Arbor's actions is reduced.76 
a. Evaluating argument number one: intergovernmental competi-
tive checks are greater at the local level. The first problem with this 
position is that Posner's calculation does not incorporate the costs to 
the individual and society of using "forced migration" as a means of 
preserving freedom. It is important not to trivialize the transaction 
costs of making an individual move in an effort to exercise her rights 
of free speech. These costs are not nonexistent or inconsequential. 
Their omission is inconsistent with one of the basic tenets of the law 
and economics movement. The costs associated with implementing a 
regulation must be a factor in the decisionmaking process. Unfortu-
nately, as Posner's formula now stands, there is no variable that con-
siders the transaction costs incurred by the individual who must 
relocate to exercise her rights as guaranteed under the first amend-
ment. Posner's conclusion cannot be accepted until all of the transac-
tion costs have been accounted for. 
Additionally, in focusing on local checks, Posner ignores the exis-
tence of countervailing checks at the national level that argue for the 
reverse proposition. These checks may outweigh the influence of the 
intergovernmental competition factors isolated by Posner. Given the 
greater diversity of interests and the broader base of constituents, it is 
arguably more difficult to pass a speech restriction at the national 
level. The watchdog attention of the press is also more sharply fo-
cused on federal actions. In contrast, there may be a tendency for 
smaller towns to be more provincial, or for minority interests to be 
significantly underrepresented. The validity of any of these claims is 
enough to cast serious doubt on the wisdom of Posner's conclusion.77 
In reality, a regulation that restricts an 'individual's access to local 
means of communication may be more disruptive to the ordinary per-
75. The gravity of this assumption and its many implications cannot be overlooked; its valid-
ity is questioned in infra Part II.B.1.c. 
76. Nothing within this line of reasoning can mitigate the damage that a local restriction will 
cause to the local marketplace of ideas. Damage to the local marketplace, and its effects on local 
decisionmaking, will be just as great for the local citizens as it would be if the restriction were 
implemented on a nationwide basis. 
77. It is equally premature to claim that the existence of these countervailing checks justifies 
a greater level of scrutiny as the size of the governmental authority imposing the restriction 
decreases. What is needed is a more careful evaluation of the relative influences of these checks 
and counter-checks. This type of careful, relative comparison is not conducted in Posner's arti-
cle, and his conclusion that localities should be afforded greater ability to suppress should be met 
with skepticism. 
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son than a regulation that restricts her access to national means of 
communication. It is likely that local avenues of communication are 
intrinsically more valuable to the average citizen. These are the means 
that are most frequently used and most accessible. Suppression of 
these means removes more realistic options and hence has a greater 
detrimental effect than prohibiting the average person from using na-
tional means of communication. A theory that does not factor in this 
potentiality when calculating the value of speech lost due to suppres-
sion, V, will not foster the socially optimum level of free speech. 
b. Evaluating argument number two: the smaller size of the af-
fected population implies less harm due to suppression. Using the size 
of the actual and potential audience as a proxy for the value of the 
speech at issue raises some serious questions. Measuring the actual 
size of the audience is obviously not enough, but the seeming objectiv-
ity involved in calculating the size of the potential audience is a facade. 
The size of the potential audience is not an observable quantity. One 
of the primary elements that influences it is the worth or value of the 
speech, but this is the unobservable, unquantifiable element for which 
size is a proxy. The process is circular and assigning a value to either 
one is necessarily a subjective determination. 
There are also examples where there exist large observable audi-
ences where courts have determined that the speech has little or no 
value. It is possible to estimate accurately the size of the audience for 
various forms of pornography by examining the market demand, and 
yet courts have not imputed value based upon size alone. 78 Con-
versely, there are political points of view that are wholly objectionable 
to a vast majority of the population that are extended a high degree of 
protection. 79 
Posner's analysis of the Skokie decision, so where the court system 
allowed a group of Nazis to parade through a predominantly Jewish 
suburb of Chicago, illustrates the difficulty of predicting the size of the 
potential audience.81 Posner claims that one of the factors leading to a 
small V was "the fact that the denial of a parade permit in one suburb 
restricted only one mode of expression in one small area of the coun-
try."82 Were the only intended members of the audience the citizens 
of Skokie? Posner concludes yes, even though he concedes that it was 
78. Decisions in this field can also be explained by analyzing the harm side of the equation. 
Even if judges imputed a V commensurate with the size of the observable audience, they could 
still uphold a restriction based upon a high magnitude of harm, L. This would especially be true 
in cases of exploitation such as child pornography. 
79. An example of this can be found in the speech of the Ku Klux Klan. See Brandenburg v. 
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); supra note 33. 
80. Collin v. Smith, 447 F. Supp. 676 (N.D. Ill.), ajfd., 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 
439 U.S. 916 (1978). 
81. See Posner, supra note 1, at 30.32. 
82. Id. at 30. 
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obvious that the parade would not persuade many members of the 
community. Yet, arguably, the audience for the march was the entire 
nation. Posner does not adequately explore the possibility that an ac-
tivity, suppressed because of a small actual audience size, may (by de-
sign) draw national media attention if allowed to take place. Does the 
judge calculate the value of Vbased on those physically present, those 
within reach of the local news, or those within reach of national media 
coverage? This is an important unanswered question if the value of 
the speech is to be measured by the size of the audience. 
A very serious structural criticism of Posner's analysis on this 
point is that he factors a smaller audience size only into the calculation 
of the value of the speech lost through suppression. A basic principle 
in all of mathematics is that what is done on one side of an equation 
must be done on the other, if the integrity of the relationship is to be 
maintained. The size of the actual and potential audience is also rele-
vant to the calculation of the magnitude of the anticipated harm and 
the probability of its occurrence. A smaller audience significantly 
scales down the harm side of the equation. Posner never considers this 
fact. None of the conclusions stemming from his analysis of the audi-
ence size can be upheld unless it can be demonstrated that the propor-
tionate decrease in the value of the speech, V, due to a smaller audience 
size is greater than the corresponding decrease in the magnitude and 
probability of harm. No attempt is made to do this. This omission 
should prove fatal to any of Posner's mathematically based arguments 
in support of affording localities greater authority to suppress speech. 
There are many substantial obstacles to any theory that attempts to 
give localities greater authority to suppress speech based upori the fact 
that fewer people are affected. 
c. Evaluating argument number three: the availability of substi-
tute speech implies less harm due to the suppression. Are local regula-
tions only partial restrictions on the national marketplace which 
should be afforded greater tolerance? One problem with this argument 
is that it assumes that the only, or primary, goal of the first amend-
ment is to preserve a national marketplace of ideas. To the extent that 
there are other goals and objectives, the argument is weakened. 83 
83. The marketplace rationale does not hold a monopoly on acceptable goals and values to be 
upheld under the first amendment. First amendment theorists have identified other values. 
Baker, for example, describes those identified by Professor Emerson: 
Emerson finds first amendment freedom essential for four values: 1) individual self-fulfill-
ment, 2) advancement of knowledge and discovery of truth, 3) participation in decisionmak-
ing by all members of the society (which embraces the right to participate in the building of 
the whole culture), and 4) achievement of a 'more adaptable and hence stable co=unity.' 
Baker, supra note 29, at 990-91 (quoting T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRES-
SION 6-7 (1971)). The legal literature and the judiciary have managed to compile a list much 
more extensive than Emerson's: 
[T]he Court has been unwilling to confine the first amendment to a single value, or even a 
few values. In recent years, the first amendment literature has exploded with co=entary 
finding first amendment values involving liberty, self realization, the marketplace of ideas, 
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The argument's focus on aggregate effects illustrates one of the 
dangers of using a market-based analysis in the field of constitutional 
law. Market analysis shifts attention away from the individual and 
towards socially aggregated sums where the individual can become an 
expendable victim of marginal analysis. 84 A market view of the first 
amendment transforms the Constitution into a document, the purpose 
of which is to protect an idea's right of access and right to compete in 
the marketplace, instead of a document designed to protect all per-
sons' right to express the idea. 
The principal reason that a partial restriction does not do substan-
tial damage to the market is that it is assumed that speech in one local-
ity can closely substitute for speech in another. What does this 
assumption imply? Alternative sources of speech will be close substi-
tutes only if there is a very high degree of homogeneity in the national 
population. If communities are significantly different from each other 
and generate different inputs into the national marketplace, then the 
suppression of ideas in one community cannot be compensated by 
shifting to ideas created in another community. Likewise, if there is a 
unique voice within the suppressed community that could be heard 
nowhere else, then there would be no substitutes, and hence a discrete 
loss. 
Problems would also result if the quantity of speech was important 
to a message being successful within the marketplace. This would be 
the case if an idea needed broad-based support to be successful, or if it 
required some critical mass to meet a minimum threshold of credibil-
ity in the marketplace. If either of these were the case, then local sup-
equality, self government, checking government and more .•.• The Court has been generous 
about the range of values relevant in first amendment theory, and unreceptive to those who 
ask it to confine first amendment values to a particular favorite. 
Shiffrin, supra note 48, at 12.52. 
84. There is a perverse logic at work here that is deceptively easy to accept ifit is not dwelled 
on too long. The argument goes like this: Speech is protected so we can find truth. Truth is a 
product of competing ideas. Therefore, it is important for ideas to be expressed, but it is not 
relevant who expresses them. Similar reasoning was at work when Chief Justice Burger wrote 
for the Court, "With broadcasting, where the available means of communication are limited in 
both space and time, the admonition of Professor Alexander Meiklejohn that '[W]hat is essential 
is not that everyone shall speak, but that everything worth saying shall be said' is particularly 
appropriate." Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Natl. Comm. 412 U.S. 94, 122 
(1973) (quoting A. MEIKLEJOHN, PoLmCAL FREEDOM 26 (1948)). If this reasoning is ac-
cepted, however, it becomes possible to justify the suppression of individual speech once the 
threshold of socially optimum idea expression has been crossed. When the first amendment is a 
means to an end and not an end in itself, then the rights of the individual can be lost on the 
margin. As one writer has noted: 
Courts usually articulate constitutional rights as "individual rights" that are justified be-
cause of the protection they afford to the person exercising the right. But courts that invoke 
the marketplace model of the first amendment justify free expression because of the aggre-
gate benefits to society, and not because an individual speaker receives a particular benefit. 
Courts that focus their concern on the audience rather than the speaker relegate free expres-
sion to an instrumental value, a means towards some goal, rather than a value unto itself. 
Ingber, supra note 29, at 4 (footnotes omitted). 
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pression would cause significant harm even if the exact same idea were 
being expressed in another community. 
d. The market failure implicit in Posner's rule. Ironically, the 
logical extension of Posner's thesis that the suppression of speech at 
the local level is more justified than on the federal level produces an 
economically and socially inefficient result. Posner's reasoning creates 
a classic market failure by failing to force localities to internalize all of 
the costs of their decisions. 85 Each of the arguments in support of 
allowing greater local suppression depends for its persuasiveness on 
the existence of a safe haven where there is no similar suppression. 
Local suppression is not that dangerous because an individual can al-
ways move somewhere without suppression, the size of the affected 
population is small because someplace else is not suppressing speech, 
or local suppression is only a partial ban because there are alternative 
sources of substitute speech. Unfortunately, there is no check within 
the system because none of the localities are forced to ip.ternalize the 
ramifications of their decisions or to consider the effects of their ac-
tions on other localities before acting. Each locality in succession 
could choose to suppress, and there is nothing within the formula as 
interpreted by Posner to stop them. 
This market failure is analogous to allowing a jurisdiction to pol-
lute. the environment because there will be clean air in another juris-
diction. Even if the surplus of pollution in one locality creates less 
than a socially unacceptable level of pollution in the aggregate, there is 
no guarantee that other jurisdictions will not act in a similar manner. 
Every other jurisdiction can perform the exact same decisionmaking 
process to produce a level of pollution that is detrimental in the aggre-
gate. A series of logical decisions at the micro-level under this system 
can produce a socially unacceptable level of damage. 
Each locality individually has an incentive to adopt a level of sup-
pression that is greater than desirable, because it does not have to bear 
all of the costs associated with its actions. Additionally, since no lo-
cality is required to stop once the aggregate level exceeds that which is 
socially optimum, it is very possible that this system would produce a 
network of regulations, through incremental steps, that would be re-
jected out of hand if proposed by the federal government. 
In summary, the hypothesis that economic analysis justifies greater 
suppression of speech at the local level must be rejected. Such a hy-
pothesis is neither economically mandated nor even economically 
wise. This fact illustrates that labeling the analysis as economic and 
making reference to formulas is no guarantee of a sound result. 
85. For a thorough explanation of the concept of market failures and externalities, see infra 
Part 11.B.2.a. 
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2. Claim: Externality Analysis Can Guide Government Policies 
Towards the Regulation of Speech 
The concept of market failures such as externalities can lend help-
ful insight into first amendment theory. In economics, an externality 
exists when market mechanisms are, unable to incorporate all of the 
costs or benefits of a commodity in its price. When this occurs, the 
quantity of the commodity generated by the interaction of market 
forces will differ from the quantity that is socially optimal. 86 
a. The theory of externalities explained: spillover costs and bene-
fits. There are both external harms and external benefits. The classic 
example of an external harm is that of pollution. Pollution harms in-
dividuals who are not party to the market transaction. Because of this 
fact, the producer does not include the costs of pollution into the cal-
culation of the private costs of production. This means that the pro-
ducer is able to charge a lower price, and hence produce a higher 
quantity of the commodity. The level of final production will be 
higher than socially desirable. The government may respond by regu-
lating polluters in an effort to decrease the harms that unrestricted 
market forces would create. 
An example of an external benefit is that of vaccination against 
diseases. Vaccinations benefit individuals not party to the market 
transaction. Not only does the person who gets vaccinated not con-
tract the disease, but all of the pe~ple that she would have infected, 
had she contracted the disease, do not become ill. Since not all of the 
benefits are internalized by the individuals making the market deci-
sions, the quantity of vaccinations supplied and demanded will be be-
low the level that is socially desirable. In this case the government 
may want to provide subsidies in an effort to increase the amount of 
vaccinations. 
b. The implications of external benefits of speech. The concept of 
externalities creates the basis for a powerful theory of regulation. 
When market structures break down and fail to internalize all of the 
costs and benefits of engaging in an activity, then some type of govern-
86. For an exploration of externality theory, see Dahlman, supra note 26; N. MERCURO & T. 
RYAN, supra note 35, 'at 43-68. Externality theory can be summarized as follows: 
The conventional approach to externalities rests upon the recognition that this perfectly 
competitive market, by taking into account all costs and benefits, equates marginal social 
benefits (MBs) with marginal social costs (MCs) and thereby produces an efficient allocation 
of resources. However, it also recognizes that some activities of the economic actors in the 
economy, for a variety of reasons, can drive a wedge into the perfectly functioning markets 
which tends to result in some costs or benefits ... going unaccounted for in market transac-
tions. The existence of externalities will cause a divergence between the marginal social 
benefits and the marginal social costs. The problem then is to find a mechanism to commu-
nicate any heretofore unaccounted external benefits or costs to the market participants. In 
doing so, externalities are said to be "internalized" thereby restoring an efficient allocation 
of resources to society (i.e., MBs = MCs). 
Id. at 44. 
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ment intervention may be justified. 87 
Posner claims that political speech is one such example. He argues 
that information is a communal good and that "the investment [that 
individuals] make in producing information will benefit others as well 
as themselves. As a result the producers will fail to carry the produc-
tion of the information to the point where marginal social cost and 
marginal social benefit are equated."88 This is especially true in the 
case where the information is political. The primary benefits of dis-
seminating political information are external. The benefits are derived 
from improved political competition and democratic decisionmaking. 
The original speaker is able to capture only a small fraction of this for 
individual private profit. Just as in the case of vaccinations, external-
ity theory indicates that there is a tendency for the marketplace to 
produce a level of information that is well below that which would be 
socially optimal. 
Faced with this state of affairs, the government could either take 
affirmative steps to correct the failure, or it could respond more con-
servatively by being careful not to take steps which make the problem 
worse. A positive response would be to subsidize the speech activity. 
This has not been an option that has been widely followed in the 
United States. 89 The negative response is embodied .µi the ethic, "at 
least do no harm." Posner draws the analogy to the policy of not tax-
ing charities.90 Given the fragile nature of political speech and the 
possibility that society is already operating at a suboptimal level of 
production, at a minimum the government should not do anything 
that restricts speech any further. The latter is the mandate derived 
directly from the words of the Constitution, "Congress shall make no 
law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press .... "91 
Posner's formula accounts for the existence of external benefits by 
assigning a higher quantity to the value of the speech lost due to sup-
pression, V. This is done in part through a quantity compensation. V 
depends both on the intrinsic worth of the speech and the quantity of 
the speech that is lost. External benefits are associated both with high 
value and with a large quantity of speech lost due to its fragile stand-
ing in the market. Posner is quick to point out, however, that a higher 
value for V does not translate in:o absolute immunity for the speech in 
87. It should be remembered that before any decision to act is made, the actor should con-
sider the transaction costs of the proposed regulation. See supra note 26. 
88. Posner, supra note 1, at 20. 
89. Reasons for not adopting specific subsidies for speech include a strong laissez-faire ethic 
and a fear of governmental bias and manipulation of the marketplace of ideas. For additional 
criticisms of a subsidies-based approach to correcting market failures in the marketplace for 
ideas, see Baker, supra note 29, at 988-89. 
90. See Posner, supra note 1, at 20. 
91. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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question.92 A higher value for V makes it harder to regulate, but even 
a high V can be outweighed by a very significant harm, L, and a strong 
probability, P. 
Posner advocates using external benefits as a means of distinguish-
ing among different categories of speech in order to create a hierarchy 
of protected classes. 93 While political speech is characterized by the 
existence of many external benefits, Posner believes that other types of 
speech are not. "Most of the benefits of advertising a particular brand 
of good or service ... are captured by the producer of that brand .... 
The consumer benefits of pornography are captured by the 
pornographer in the price of the pornographic work. There are no 
external benefits."94 If, in fact, there are no externalities involved, 
then the level of commercial speech and pornography produced by the 
marketplace will coincide with the socially optimum level. Under 
Posner's formula, this fact would translate into a smaller value for V. 
This type of speech is also more robust and less vulnerable to regula-
tion. There would be a lower probability of a restriction causing the 
level of speech to deviate significantly from the socially optimum level. 
Both of these factors would result in the extension of less first amend-
ment protection to pornography and commercial speech as a class.95 
Conversely, the existence of many external benefits flowing from polit-
ical speech bolsters its uniquely protected status. 
c. The implications of the external costs of speech. Just as the 
existence of external benefits provides arguments against regulating 
certain types of speech, the existence of external costs provides a ra-
tionale in support of the regulation of other types of speech. A basic 
premise behind this claim is the assumption that the regulator should 
be particularly concerned with costs associated with speech that fall 
upon third parties.96 The participants in an activity are in a relatively 
better position to judge for themselves the consequences of their ac-
tions and conduct themselves accordingly. Individuals not party to 
the communication are completely unable to anticipate potential dan-
gers and protect themselves. 
Posner's treatment of the potential implications of the external 
costs of speech is not extensive. What follows is an examination of 
some of the ramifications of Posner's hypothesis coupled with tradi-
tional economic market failure theory. Viewing regulation from the 
perspective of external costs provides a mechanism for understanding 
many principles of first amendment law. One cannot yell fire in a 
92. Posner, s~pra note l, at 24. 
93. Id. at 22-23. 
94. Id. at 22. 
95. For a general treatment of the issue of commercial speech and how it fits into the broader 
scheme of first amendment theory, see generally Shiffrin, supra note 48. 
96. Posner, supra note 1, at 29-30. 
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crowded theater, since the costs associated with such an action fall 
primarily upon persons other than the speaker. Commercial advertis-
ers are not free to make false claims about their products. Such fraud 
and misrepresentation create classic spillover harms because they un-
dermine the ability of the advertised price to communicate the true 
value of the commodity. 
A theory of external costs might also be employed to justify greater 
regulation of pornography. If one accepts the theory that pornogra-
phy causes serious long-term problems such as inciting sex-based 
crimes, then it logically follows that the price of pornography estab-
lished by the marketplace does not reflect all of the social costs of 
production. Just as with the example of pollution, there is a level of 
production, and hence a level of harm, that is above the socially opti-
mum result. In essence, the failure to internalize all of the costs asso-
ciated with pornography results in the production of surplus 
pornographic materials. Faced with such an externality, resorting to 
some type of regulation which forces the internalization of all costs of 
production makes sense. The sticky issue is establishing adequate 
proof of the existence of harm, especially causation. If this threshold 
determination can be made, however, externality theory advocates ac-
tion. In this sense, Posner's economic approach to the first amend-
ment lends support to a tort-based cause of action against 
pornographers. If external harms in fact exist, then the surplus should 
be eliminated. Regulation would be supported, however, only to the 
extent that it internalizes the costs of the external harms. With por-
nography, given the speculative nature of the harm, an after-the-fact 
remedy would be superior to censorship because it would reduce sig-
nificantly the cost of legal error. 
The existence of spillover costs leads the judge to attach a zero, or 
potentially negative quantity, to the value of the speech lost due to 
suppression, V. In these instances, the case for regulation is strongest. 
If the judge upholds a restriction, there is less danger of the speech 
falling below the socially optimum level. Inaction in the face of exter-
nal costs, on the other hand, has the same effect as providing a subsidy 
for the activity causing the harm. 
There is one very important caveat. Based on Posner's formula, a 
judge may justifiably strike down a regulation even if she attaches a 
zero (or potentially negative) value to V. This would happen if there 
was a large legal error, E, involved. If the potential for error is great 
enough to outweigh the harm side of the equation, then the judge must 
strike down the regulation, even in the face of external costs. A large 
E value would result if it were difficult to distinguish between the regu-
lated speech and other types of valuable speech or if there was a seri-
ous chance that the precedent would snowball and affect other types of 
communication. E would also be large if the evidence supporting the 
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existence of the externality was speculative or subjective. The signifi-
cance of the error term, E, should not be underestimated; it may well 
be the most important term in the formula. Given the subjective na-
ture of most first amendment issues, its value will usually be quite 
large. The potential magnitude of the legal-error term goes far in ex-
plaining this great deference traditionally given to free speech by the 
courts. 
Part H's examination of Posner's method from an internal perspec-
tive illustrates the mixed potential of economics as applied to the first 
amendment. An economic approach to constitutional law will not be 
successful if it attempts to treat rights-based issues in a traditional neo-
classical fashion. The traditional tools of the economist are not di-
rectly transferable to this field. Difficulties arise in the form of 
complicated utility curves and preferences and the lack of any external 
objective measure of value. These difficulties reflect the challenge that 
this new endeavor entails, because many valuable economic concepts 
potentially can be transplanted if the economist respects the unique 
demands imposed by the legal setting. 
The testing of two of Posner's results illustrates, again, both the 
problems and the promise of his approach. His treatment of externali-
ties demonstrates how economic concepts can be used successfully to 
provide a descriptive analysis of existing practices, and guidance as to 
the future direction of governmental policies. His claim that econom-
ics justifies affording localities greater ability to suppress speech, how-
ever, illustrates the potential dangers of sloppy economic analysis. 
III. SHOULD THE FIRST AMENDMENT BE SUBJECTED TO AN 
ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION? 
The discussion has until now suspended the question of whether or 
not the first amendment should be subjected to an economic interpre-
tation and has concentrated on examining the operation and results of 
Posner's method. It is now necessary to focus on the issue of whether 
the "super rationality" and mechanical nature of the economic per-
spective is appropriate in the realm of constitutional freedom of speech 
theory. 
A. The Economic Perspective and the Courts' Traditional 
Institutional Role 
There are many areas of tension between the economic perspective 
and the judiciary's traditional procedures and practices. An ideal 
decisionmaking model tries to be as comprehensive as possible. The 
objective is to consider all relevant issues before reaching any conclu-
sion. Any economic analysis conducted by the judiciary is going to be 
performed under serious procedural and institutional constraints. 
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Each of these constraints will take its toll on the accuracy and viability 
of an economic interpretation of the first amendment. 
Courts have limited resources, time, and expertise. Under current 
physical pressures and limitations they may not be able to perform 
extensive· cost-benefit analysis.97 Some authors have also questioned 
whether the use of a broad-based economic approach is consistent 
with the courts' institutional role and a proper understanding of the 
doctrine of separation of powers.98 
Additionally, there are procedural constraints on the types of is-
sues that can be addressed in a courtroom. For example, no party can 
assert a claim without fulfilling the proper standing requirements. 
What happens when a factor relevant to the economic evaluation can-
not be asserted because the affected party lacks standing? This would 
be a particular problem when dealing with the externalities of speech. 
By definition, external benefits and costs fall upon nebulous groups 
who are not party to the communication, or who may not be readily 
identifiable. In addition, courts must also have proper jurisdiction, 
there must be a real case and controversy, the issue cannot involve a 
political question, and so on. There are many reasons why a court 
may not consider a factor otherwise relevant to an economic decision-
making process. These constraints are foreign to the rational, compre-
hensive utility-maximizer. This fact places limitations on the court's 
ability to apply optimization theory. While these criticisms are not 
· necessarily fatal, nor even unique to the economic perspective, they do 
illustrate that there will be pragmatic difficulties in implementing an 
economic perspective that must be examined. The difficulties and con-
straints cannot be assumed away or ignored. . 
An economic perspective may also be inconsistent with the courts' 
role as an arbitrator of disputes between specific individuals. Tribe 
criticizes the application of economic theory in the field of constitu-
tional law because, in his view, economics inherently entails an ex 
ante perspective, while law traditionally adopts an ex post perspective: 
From one side, the nature of litigation invites judges to apply an ex post 
approach to dispute resolution, an approach that requires a court to take 
the position of the parties as given and to apportion losses and profits 
fairly among them. From the other side, sophisticated judges who "ap-
preciate" the economic system are pulled toward an ex ante approach, in 
which a court is interested less in doing justice in the case at hand than 
97. Professor Aleinikoff argues that as an empirical matter, the Supreme Court has taken 
shortcuts when faced with decisions which have called for balancing. "[I]n making balancing 
work, the Court has adopted a truncated form that ought not to be acceptable to the conscien-
tious balancer." Aleinikoff, supra note 55, at 978-79. 
98. See, e.g., id. at 984-86. Similar reservations have been expressed about courts basing first 
amendment decisions on the clear-and-present-danger standard, or a Dennis-type formula. Crit-
ics of these traditional first amendment standards claim that such methods involve determina-
tions that are inappropriate for the judicial branch to make. See, e.g., Bork, Neutral Principles 
and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 33-34 (1971). 
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in creating sound rules to govern the behavior of the world at large.99 
Are judges grand social planners, or is their primary purpose to re-
solve specific conflicts? 
This tension underlies the problems created when a body that is 
designed to resolve disputes between individuals tries to use a theory 
which is premised upon identifying socially optimum levels and which 
assumes, for statistical accuracy, the existence of a large number of 
cases and theoretical averages.100 Economists do not make decisions 
based upon one isolated observation. They try to extract what is com-
mon to a large group of observations and act according to those aver-
ages. Judges, on the other hand, are confined to the facts of a 
particular case, and the skill of lawyering is frequently to find what is 
unique about the facts of a particular case and to fashion specific rules 
accordingly. 
The role of social planner and individual dispute resolver will coin-
cide only when the optimal solution on the micro-level is the same as 
that which is true in the aggregate. In reality, it is doubtful that the fit 
will be perfect. The pragmatic challenge to integrating an economic 
perspective into first amendment law will be to glean what is useful 
from an ex ante social theory and to implement it while still doing 
justice to the individual facts. Striking this delicate balance will not be 
different in kind from the Supreme Court's current challenge of fash-
ioning decisions that are proper for the individual case, but still serve 
as valuable precedent for a broader range of cases.101 
B. Potential Dangers in Applying Economics to Constitutional Law 
Advocating an active role for economics in constitutional analysis 
is not without potential undesirable consequences. Dangers take the 
form both of problems inherent in the economic perspective and 
problems which stem from how the economic analysis is conducted. 
1. The Dangers of Thinkability and Lowering the 
Threshold of Regulation 
Creating a formula that enables a judge to determine mechanically 
whether or not a restriction is valid may increase the impetus to regu-
late more strictly. An imprecise or fuzzy line may cause officials to 
keep their distance and think twice before imposing a restriction. The 
99. Tribe, supra note 57, at 593 (footnotes omitted). 
100. Economics as a discipline is very dependent upon the weak law of large numbers (the 
law of averages). If the economist deals with enough observations, then no single abnormal ob-
servation can distort the analysis. No individual case carries that much weight. Courts are not 
in a similar position. They must deal with each case individually on its merits. 
101. The use of test cases, or careful selection of proper fact scenarios upon which to base 
important decisions, illustrates some ways in which courts might integrate both approaches. 
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finer the line becomes, the more likely officials may be to regulate. 102 
Economists would counter that a fuzzy line is inefficient and allows 
speech that creates net levels of harm to be perpetuated. The problem 
is that the economic method is more precise in theory than in practice. 
Currently, the instruments are still rather blunt, and they become even 
more dull as the determination becomes more subjective. 
The legal-error term in Posner's formula can limit some of the po-
tential for abuse. Theorists who believe the value of Eis inherently 
large in all attempts to restrict speech would reject most regulations 
out of hand. Their formalistic claim would be that the value of E is so 
great that even if Vis small, E > P X L/(1 + i)n for most potential 
harms. These "risk averse" judges would choose to accept greater 
amounts of harm due to speech, ev~n given a high probability of harm, 
than risk the potential abuses of regulation. It is possible to view the 
first amendment, as well as most other sections of the Bill of Rights, as 
the product of "risk averse" preferences. It is a national insurance 
policy against the abuses of governmental power. It is odd that Posner 
never examines the potential consequences of risk aversion in his anal-
ysis. If the Constitution is viewed as a risk-averse document, then the 
tremendous degree of latitude given to free speech can be explained 
without having to assume that first amendment values are absolute. 
Evaluating risk preferences in the area of free speech and the exercise 
of governmental authority would be essential ·before any economic 
model could be implemented. If Posner is wrongly operating under 
the assumption of risk-neutrality, then all of his results would be 
skewed in favor of greater restrictions of speech and would produce a 
higher than optimum level of suppression. 
2. Dangers Behind Creating an Illusion of Objectivity 
and Value-Neutrality 
There are grave dangers in assuming that economics by itself offers 
a complete and comprehensive method of first amendment analysis. 103 
No economic view of the Constitution can ever be completely objec-
tive or value-neutral. Weighing constitutional interests and values, ac-
cording to Tribe, is necessarily a subjective process: 
102. The concept of "thinkability" postulates a positive correlation between the planning of 
an event and its occurrence. Thinkability also links the refinement of the tools necessary to act 
and their actual use. It is most frequently connected with criticisms of the formation of strategic 
nuclear warfighting plans. 
103. There is no one theory that can capture the whole complexity of the first amendment. 
Attempts to formulate such grand constructs have not met with success. 
Scholar after scholar has set out to produce a different but more successful general theory. 
All of these attempts, in my judgment, have been thwarted by the complexity of social 
reality .... In trying to move toward general theory, scholars have too often built abstrac-
tions without sufficient regard for the diverse contexts in which speech regulation exists .... 
It is time to move away from a general theory of the first amendment. 
Shiffrin, supra note 48, at 1283 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). 
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One final flaw in the utilitarian approach ... is its embrace of one of the 
most persistent myths of policy analysis: that analytical techniques in 
themselves lack significant substantive bias or controversial content -
that the techniques are neutral in regard to matters of value precisely 
because such matters may simply be inserted into the analysis. 104 
It is wrong to read objectivity that does not exist into formulas such as 
Posner's, or to believe that appealing to such formulas will avoid the 
need to make difficult, subjective determinations. Tribe has strongly 
criticized courts for abdicating their responsibility in favor of utilitar-
ian determinism: 
Part of the allure of efficiency curves and cost-benefit calculations is the 
illusion that these hard constitutional choices can be avoided, by courts 
if not by other political branches, through the inexorable analytic magic 
of such equations. Perhaps this analytic escape hatch is simply the latest 
in a series of accountability-avoiding devices.1os 
There will always be choices which no economic system can dictate. 
Economics provides a method of analysis; seldom is the method out-
come-determinative. Economics can provide no answers independent 
of the inputs introduced. 
As a tool, economics can provide helpful insights, an organized 
method of framing the discussion, and a means to help isolate relevant 
decisionmaking factors; economics cannot replace the element of 
human judgment. 
So perceived, the aim of policy-analytic techniques is not to "substitute 
for the experience, the intuition, and the judgment of the decision 
maker," but to "sharpen that intuition and judgment by stating problems 
more precisely, by discovering new alternatives, and by making explicit 
the comparisons among alternatives."106 
A real danger exists when an illusion of objectivity is created. If 
this happens, then people may start to accept the conclusions pro-
duced by the formula, without strictly examining the controversial 
subjective process of weighing the inputs. This danger is magnified 
when the economic method is combined with legal advocacy.107 There 
is also a danger that becoming overly technical in the process of deci-
sionmaking will alienate people from constitutional discussion. 108 
104. Tribe, supra note 57, at 597 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original). 
105. Id. at 620 (footnote omitted). 
106. Tribe, Technology Assessment and the Fourth Discontinuity, supra note 58, at 626 (quot-
ing Rowen, Objectives, Alternatives, Costs and Effectiveness, in PROGRAM BUDGETING AND BEN· 
EFIT-Cosr ANALYSIS (H. Hinrichs & G. Taylor eds. 1969)). 
107. An economic conclusion is only as valid as its assumptions are credible. Objective aca· 
demic writing is careful to identify what these assumptions are and explain their limitations. The 
advocate, on the other hand, tries her best to minimize the limitations of the analysis and sell the 
conclusions. This basic difference in approaches is certain to cause problems in all elements of 
law that attempt to draw _upon the harder sciences. 
108. See Aleinikoff, supra note 55, at 993. 
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3. Tarnishing the First Amendment's Unique Symbolic Status 
The law and economics movement has a profound effect upon the 
form as well as the substance of constitutional discourse. The form 
aml substance of the constitutional discourse, in tum, directly affect 
the way the first amendment is perceived. Applying economic theory, 
with its strict utilitarian emphasis, to the value of free speech may 
tarnish the document's unique symbolic status. The problem is exac-
erbated when traditional economic principles are· carelessly trans-
planted into the foreign setting of the courtroom. The role of the 
economist and that of the advocate do not naturally complement each 
other. The tools of social science can easily be manipulated to serve 
the ends of the partisan. The line between what is normative and what 
is positive is difficult enough to keep straight in a purely academic 
realm. 109 Given this fact, it is important to examine what effect the 
use of economic principles in this sensitive noneconomic forum will 
have on the way people think about the first amendment. 
Adopting an economic perspective will have an impact on the way 
constitutional values are perceived. The Constitution enjoys a status 
of super symbolism in our society. The document and the rights that 
it enshrines are of mythic proportion. The economic perspective, how-
ever, lacks this symbolic dimension. It treats freedom of speech no 
differently than any other commodity, such as wheat. The theory that 
all goods are substitutes for each other literally does imply that a given 
amount of free speech is worth only X bushels of wheat. Aleinikoff 
fears that this may erode the uniqueness of the values protected by the 
Constitution: 
But our eyes are no longer focused on the Constitution. If each constitu-
tional provision, every constitutional value is understood simply as an 
invitation for a discussion of good social policy, it means little to talk of 
constitutional "theory." 
Ultimately, the notion of constitutional supremacy hangs in the bal-
ance. For under a regime of balancing, a constitutional judgment no 
longer looks like a trump. It seems merely to be a card of a higher value 
in the same suit.11° 
The symbolic virtues of the first amendment are lost when freedom of 
109. Many of these problems are not inherent to the application of economic theory and can 
be avoided if the writer has a proper understanding of the rhetorical effects of the prose. There 
are many competing obligations placed upon the objective interdisciplinary writer. There is a 
duty to introduce and explain unfamiliar concepts to a lay audience and at the same time main-
tain the integrity of the economic analysis. There is a duty to identify and not understate the 
limitations of the analysis and the economic theories. The writer should flag simplifying assump-
tions and explain their implications. The writer must be sensitive to the special and unique 
characteristics of the noneconomic field to which the theories are being applied. The application 
of economics to constitutional law has the potential both to alienate some audiences and to be 
overly persuasive to others. These problems can be minimized if writers are careful to signal 
when they are changing hats from objective positive economic evaluation to normative economic 
evaluation, as well as from academic expert to legal advocate. 
110. Aleinikoff, supra note 55, at 992. 
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speech is reduced to just another factor to be weighed along with 
others upon an economic scale. 
C. The Inability of Economics To Make World-Shaping Decisions 
Economic analysis is by its nature system-preserving. Cost-benefit 
analysis can produce the optimum decision relative to a given set of 
underlying constraints, Xv X 21 X:i. ••• XII' It does not provide a means 
of evaluating or changing the set of goals and objectives on which the 
given optimization problem is premised. For example, economics can 
determine the best policy, given a certain distribution of income, but it 
cannot determine whether the distribution of income is itself just. 111 
Economics is incapable of handling complex issues of distributive jus-
tfoe. It can provide necessary, but not sufficient, criteria for decision-
making when confronted with constitutive, world-shaping 
decisions. 112 
If the world were a closed system in which there existed only one 
correct answer to a given question, then economic analysis (which de-
termines whether, given conditions Xv X:z, X:i. ••• Xno course Yis the 
optimum solution) could dictate whether course Y is "right." Such a 
closed system would contain one objectively definable set of values, 
standards, goals, ends, and purposes. These factors would be con-
stant, would transcend time, and would remain invariant. In a closed 
system, the decisions made do not influence or change the underlying 
set of goals and objectives, and hence do not alter future points of 
optimization. Within this type of static world, economics could pro-
vide both a necessary and sufficient criterion for decisionmaking. 
Fortunately, the world is not a closed system, and there is no sin-
gle, invariant set of object~vely defined ends. As society progresses, it 
evolves, and as it evolves over time the "right" answer, or point of 
maximization, changes. The decisions made along the way influence 
the underlying constraint set of societal goals and objectives. The 
choices we make today determine what type of world we enter to-
morrow, and what the future points of optimization will be. Under 
such dynamic conditions, economics alone cannot dictate whether a 
given course is "right." 
The judge is faced not with one invariant "real" world, but with a 
future filled with many different and competing possible worlds. The 
issue then becomes, Which possible world does the judge choose? Ec-
onomics can only dictate the correctness of choices within a given pos-
111. See c. VEUANOVSKI, LA w AND EcONOMICS, supra note 35, at 42-44; Tribe, supra 
note 57, at 594-95, 597. 
112. Professor Tribe develops a related criticism of the application of economic principles to 
constitutional analysis. He speaks of the inability of economics to deal with the "constitutive" 
dimension of constitutional decisionmaking. See Tribe, supra note 57, at 606-14; Tribe, Technol-
ogy Assessment and the Fourth Discontinuity, supra note 58, at 635-41. 
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sible world. Given conditions Xi. X0 X:i. ..• Xn and a defined set of 
goals and constraints, cost-benefit analysis can be used to derive a 
point of optimization. 
It is logical to require, as a necessary condition, that any choice 
made be the best possible choice (maximum) relative to the world in 
which it is chosen. This is to say that any choice made should reflect 
the point of optimization given the defined underlying goals and con-
straints. If the judge is confronted with alternatives in two different 
possible worlds, however, each one representing the point of optimiza-
tion relative to the underlying values and factors that constitute it, 
then economics can provide no insight as to which choice should be 
made. 
The fact that economics cannot, by itself, provid~ a framework to 
make all important constitutional decisfons does not mean that it can-
not play a valuable role. It can provide meaningful insight and a help-
ful framework as one of the tools used by the decisionmaker. 
Demonstrating the inability of economics to make world-shaping deci-
sions simply serves to caution that no economic perspective of the first 
amendment can or should be embraced with ideological zeal as the 
final solution. 
IV. CONCLUSION: THE COSTS AND BENEFITS 
OF AN EcONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 
When examining Posner's economic approach to the first amend-
ment, it is difficult to generalize. Given the complex and abstract na-
ture of the first amendment, it is inappropriate to assume that the 
marketplace of ideas shares the same underlying economic structure as 
traditional economic markets, such as the marketplace for used cars. 
This means that traditional economic assumptions must be reexam-
ined and reshaped to reflect the unique needs and demands of this 
particular legal setting. This does not mean that an economic perspec-
tive has nothing to offer. It simply means that any economic analysis 
must be conducted carefully. Much of the law and economics work to 
date has not reflected this degree of sensitivity. Posner's is no 
exception. 
In the field of first amendment theory, a successful economic ap-
proach will require a more rigorous development of a rights-based eco-
nomic theory. This work would include a closer examination ·of 
individual and social preferences for rights. Traditional assumptions 
such as completeness and continuity will have to be rethought and 
should not be blindly assumed. It is also necessary to articulate care-
fully why rights are valuable, and why society chooses to protect 
them. An economic perspective does not displace the need to ask 
these questions, and it cannot by itself provide the necessary answers. 
The answers to such questions must come from all sectors of legal 
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thought as the inputs for the construction of accurate utility analysis. 
Economics can provide a valuable framework in which to organize 
divergent theories and conduct more precise examination. This fact 
underlies the claim that economics, properly applied, is a process, and 
as a process it should not be outcome-determinative. 
It is wise to recognize the potential dangers and limitations associ-
ated with an economic perspective. Most of these dangers stem from 
how the concepts are used, and do not necessitate the total rejection of 
an economic approach. When used with full recognition of its limita-
tions, an economic perspective can provide valuable insights into first 
amendment issues. 
Posner's article constitutes an important and innovative contribu-
tion to the extension of economic analysis to the field of constitutional 
decisionmaking, but as he would probably be the first to admit, much 
more needs to be done. 
- Peter J. Hammer 
